The private-collective innovation model proposes incentives for individuals and firms to privately invest resources to create public goods innovations. Such innovations are characterized by non-rivalry and non-exclusivity in consumption. Examples include open source software, user-generated media products, drug formulas, and sport equipment designs. There is still limited empirical research on private-collective innovation. We present a case study to 1) provide empirical evidence of a case of private-collective innovation, showing specific benefits, and 2) to extend the private-collective innovation model by analyzing the hidden costs for the company involved. We examine the development of the Nokia Internet Tablet, that builds on both proprietary and open source software development, and that involves both Nokia developers and volunteers who are not employed by the company. Seven benefits for Nokia are identified, as are five hidden costs: difficulty to differentiate, guarding business secrets, reducing community entry barriers, giving up control, and organizational inertia. We examine actions taken by the management to mitigate these costs throughout the development period. Extending Private-Collective Innovation:
Introduction
In a private investment model of innovation, firms use internal processes to create ideas, knowledge, and technologies and commercialize these in the market place. Firms appropriate returns from private investment in innovation through intellectual property rights (Granstrand, 1999) . This model is contrasted with the private-collective model of innovation, where firms and individuals expend private resources to create public goods innovations. Such innovations are characterized by non-rivalry and non-exclusivity in consumption (von Hippel and von Krogh, 2003; . It is similar to "open innovation," pertaining to models of innovation where firms frequently exchange ideas, knowledge, and technology with outside firms and individuals (Chesbrough, 2003) . However, open innovation does not assume that intellectual property rights are forfeited and the resulting innovation is offered to the public for free.
Examples of private-collective innovation model include collaborative composing of music on the Internet by many musicians, the open and collective development of a drug formula for treating malaria, or the creation and sharing of new designs for sporting equipment among sports enthusiasts. An oft-cited example of the model is open source software development resulting in products such as Linux, MySQL, or Apache. Open source software comes with licenses that make it non-exclusive: the software is free for all to download, use, modify, and redistribute. Open source software is also characterized by non-rivalry as one person's use of the product does not diminish anyone else's benefits from using it.
Although researchers have examined individuals' motivations to participate in open source software development, to date there has been limited empirical examination of a firm's incentives for private-collective innovation. Moreover, the literature has emphasized the benefits the model brings to the innovator rather than the costs and has not discussed how the 3 latter could be mitigated. Research has shown that the implementation of new models of innovation often have unintended consequences, including "hidden costs" (e.g., Crawford, 1992) , and there is a need for more empirical work on the benefits and costs of implementing private-collective innovation.
In this paper, we advance empirical research on the incentives and costs of the privatecollective model of innovation. A case study design permits an in-depth investigation of benefits, costs, and actions only partly discussed in prior work (von Hippel and von Krogh, 2006) . Our case draws on quantitative and qualitative data from the creation of the Nokia Internet Tablet. Nokia based the development of this product mainly on open source software and made a large part of the research and product development transparent and accessible as a "public-goods innovation." Outside contributors involving firms and individuals, unpaid by Nokia, expended a significant amount of private resources on its development.
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we discuss the private-collective model for innovation incentives. The third section describes the research design, and the fourth section contains the case description. The fifth section presents the findings organized along the topics of benefits and costs incurred in the implementation of the model and strategic actions to mitigate these costs. Finally, we conclude the paper and outline implications for management practice and future research.
The private-collective innovation model
There are two predominant models of innovation incentives in the technology and innovation management literature. The private investment model assumes that innovators step forward and invest in innovation if and when they can appropriate returns from these 4 investments. Intellectual property rights is a necessary condition for the model because it safeguards returns appropriation (Arrow, 1962; Dam, 1995) . In contrast, the collective action model assumes that innovators, provided with the right public subsidy, contribute to public goods innovations (David, 1992; 1998; Stiglitz, 2006) . Public goods are characterized by nonrivalry and non-exclusivity in consumption. Innovations are made freely available to all as public goods. Science is often cited as an example of this model. However, companies have the option to free-ride on public goods innovations, such as, for example, a biotechnology company commercializing scientific knowledge on genetics without contributing research back to the scientific community. Therefore, society elects to subsidize the activity of innovators, e.g., university-based research on the human genome funded by the government.
Recently, a third model, called the private-collective model of innovation incentives, has been suggested where public subsidy is absent and where the innovator expends private resources for public goods innovation (von Hippel and von Krogh, 2003) . The model is counter-intuitive: why should I make my innovations available to all and why pay for something that anyone else can use for free? Generally speaking, in the case of privatecollective innovations the innovator receives higher benefits when contributing to the public goods creation than by only free-riding on its production by others. One aspect is the privately retained tacit knowledge innovators receive through the production of freely available knowledge which distinguishes them from pure users of the explicit knowledge. This implies that firms receive certain benefits during the process of creating publicly available innovations, while the mere application of such knowledge bears less incentives. (see also Grand et al., 2004; Gächter et al., 2006) 
Benefits when applying private-collective innovation
A closer examination of the model outlined in von Hippel and von and other literature reveals six complementary benefits for firms to innovate in this manner: the cost of controlling knowledge, learning, reputation gains, and fast and widespread diffusion of innovations, as well as lower cost of innovation and manufacturing. First, in the long run, the cost of protecting knowledge needed to innovate (Liebeskind, 1996) might outweigh the benefits of doing so. Often extensive investments in knowledge management systems are needed to protect information which ultimately and inevitably spills over to the public (Foray, 2004; Alavi and Leidner, 1999) . For example, although the source code for Sony's robot dog Aibo was protected, it was ultimately hacked and published by Sony's customers.
Second, innovators that contribute to collective goods innovations benefit from learning from their own and others' contributions. In addition to benefits garnered from the public goods itself (products and services), innovators also benefit from learning in the process of creating it (Allen, 1983; Nuvolari, 2004; Baldwin and Clark, 2006) . Thus, it should come as no surprise that many contributors to open source software projects are computer science students. By providing open source software to the public, contributors may get others to use it, test it, and provide feedback on how to improve it (Lakhani, et al. 2002) . Some authors have even referred to open source software projects as "epistemic communities," where people create shared knowledge of software development (Edwards, 2003) .
Third, innovators may gain a positive reputation by privately expending resources for public goods innovations (Allen, 1983; Lerner and Tirole, 2002; Muller and Penin, 2006) . For example, PricewaterhouseCoopers gains a positive reputation amongst regulators, peers, and customers when they provide research to the public on practices of corporate governance. The 6 firm's reputation is further enhanced when regulators actively use and reference the research during standard setting in principles of auditing and corporate governance (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2005) .
Fourth, being the first to contribute a public goods innovation increases the likelihood of benefiting from fast and widespread adoption of the innovation (Allen, 1983) . As a consequence, firms may gain an advantage over competitors stemming from network effects (von Hippel and von Krogh, 2003) . Establishing a "dominant design" or "open standard" onto which the firm can fit other technologies and even preempt the introduction of competing technology may provide the firm with additional advantages (Economides, 1996 ; see also Economides and Katsamakas, 2006) Fifth, by contributing to public goods innovations, the firm may lower the cost of innovation. Chesbrough (2003) argued that involving outside firms, organizations, and individuals in the development of products reduces the direct labor cost in innovation. In addition, when the firm contributes to public goods innovations, such as open source software, it can also effectively reuse existing technology found in the public sphere.
Research has shown that, in software development, the reuse of open source software is considerably higher than the reuse of firm-internal software, which should have a positive impact on the cost of innovation (see Haefliger et al., 2008) . However, much of this software comes with restrictive open source licenses, which requires the firm to make any combination between this and other software adhere to this license. Hence, while the reuse of such products may reduce costs of innovation, it also "forces" the firm to contribute to public goods innovations.
Sixth, the supply of public goods innovations to the market makes it possible for manufacturers to learn about these innovations and reduce manufacturing-incurred fixed costs related to research and development. Free access to innovations may incentivize manufacturers to ramp up manufacturing capacity, pursue economies of scale, and reduce the price of manufactured products. Additional benefits to the customers of the manufactured product may include enhanced product quality and product warranties (Kotha, 1995; Harhoff et al. 2003) .
Empirical evidence and hidden costs
Empirical research on the private-collective innovation model is mainly found in the field of open source software development where the focus has been on individual contributors and projects (e.g., Shah, 2006; Baldwin and Clark, 2006; Roberts et al. 2006; Gambardella and Hall, 2006) . Research on the application of the model by firms is rare with some exceptions: Dahlander (2004) explored the network effects available to firms that provide open source software to the public. Jeppesen and Frederiksen (2006) explored users' motives to contribute voluntarily to the development of media products by firms. Henkel (2006) 
investigated firms
that revealed open source software embedded in their devices to other firms and found incentives for them to do so. Given the focus on public goods innovations in these works, the authors have tended to focus on the cost of forfeiting intellectual property rights in the private-collective innovation model. Innovation research has pointed to several types of "hidden costs" in the implementation of new innovation models that are not inherent to or captured in the models themselves. For example, Crawford (1992) and Smith (2004) pointed to the costs of implementing the accelerated product development model in US manufacturing industries. Firms often find that the rapid launching of products that have not been properly tested leads to costly recalls, or 8 that fast product development leads to significant delays in pilot-and full-scale manufacturing. Related to open innovation, Kessler et al. (2000) found some indication that the cost of product development rose with increasing dependency on external sources of technology in the innovation process. Empirical research is needed that validates the specific benefits in the implementation of private-collective innovation, examines the costs incurred in such innovation, and identifies firms' strategies to mitigate these costs. We contribute to this research by investigating the implementation of private-collective innovation in the case of the Nokia Internet Tablet development.
Research design
The research on the development of Nokia's Internet Tablet focuses on the process of implementing private-collective innovation. We investigate benefits in implementation and extend the private-collective innovation model by identifying implementation costs and strategies to mitigate these. Research on implementation processes typically require longitudinal observation (Pettigrew, 1990) , prompting a case study design. In order to obtain insights into the development process, we gathered different types of data and performed quantitative and qualitative analysis. Done properly, such combined analysis offers valuable insight, as Shah and Corley (2006) have recently argued. In the following sections, we describe sampling, data sources, and data analysis.
Sampling
Our research design is a single-case study demanding particular attention to sampling (see Eisenhardt, 1989) . There are three reasons for selecting a particular case: fit, distinctiveness, and its revelatory nature (see also Yin, 1999; Siggelkow, 2007) . First, Nokia's Internet Tablet development represents a case that both serves to explore and extend the private-collective (Shankland and Charny, 2003) . Similar to Sharp, however, Motorola neither revealed source code beyond legal requirements, nor did the firm provide extensive developer documentation of the software on its devices. Moreover, their Linux appliances granted no administrator access to the user, inhibiting the installation or modification of native applications. Other mobile devices running embedded Linux included HP's iPAQ and the Sony Mylo. However, as we discovered in interviews and in press articles, these companies retained the software's source code and we could find no evidence that these firms attempted to build up a community of outside developers as proposed by the private-collective innovation model (von Hippel and von Krogh, 2003) .
Third, given the research gap on the implementation of private-collective innovation, we also searched for a revelatory case. The main criterion for selecting a revelatory case is the researchers' access to a previously inaccessible setting for scientific observation. Establishing ties to Nokia and the developer community surrounding the Internet Tablet, the researchers gained access to a variety of data including documents, interviews, prototypes, and online conversations. Shedding light on the reasons for and effects of this innovation project going open and abstracting these underlying intentions into a model that can be used in future research, as well as raising the attention of practitioners to this mode of product development, motivated the selection of the case.
Data sources
This study relies on several sources of data. First and most importantly, we conducted semistructured interviews, allowing participants the opportunity to narrate stories, provide anecdotes, and state opinions. Through an initial reading of the mailing lists, relevant stakeholder groups and data sources in the development project were identified as "Nokia employees," "Nokia-paid contractors," and "independent individuals." Interviews were conducted with participants from all the stakeholders identified. The initial participants were selected from the developer and user mailing lists, and subsequent interviewees were identified through snowball sampling (Heckathorn, 1997) . In total, 23 interviews were conducted, 10 with Nokia employees, 5 with contractors, and 8 with unpaid volunteers (see Table 1 ). In order to protect their privacy, interviewees were anonymized. The interviews lasted on average 75 minutes. The interview guidelines included questions on the firmcommunity relationship, strategies Nokia used to reveal knowledge and technology to the community, motivation, and other issues (see Appendix for examples of two distinct interview guidelines). The initial interview guidelines were updated and enhanced over time, integrating and building upon the results of interviews already analyzed. All interviews were transcribed verbatim and, using the software Max.QDA, codified using an open coding technique (for a discussion, see also Strauss and Corbin, 1998) . This led to the creation of 80 codes, which were subsequently merged and reduced to 12 categories including seven incentive and five cost categories. Nokia sponsors other open source projects. Some Web articles were used to get background information on the Nokia device and potential competitors. We also searched an independent
Web forum for discussions and opinions of users of the Internet Tablet.
Nokia and the development of the Internet Tablet
In this section, we present a short overview of the history of Nokia and the Internet Tablet development, and we provide a descriptive analysis of Maemo, the community for the Internet Tablet software platform. The purpose of this analysis is to confirm the correctness of the case to examine the implementation of the private-collective model for innovation incentives. 500 devices for about a third of the regular sales price to selected software developers and donate the sales to the GNOME foundation, a not-for-profit organization dedicated to supporting the GNOME graphical desktop environment (Nokia, 2005 (Martin, 2007) The hardware of the Internet Tablet differs in one main aspect from other Nokia products:
Internet Tablet History
it does not contain mobile phone functionality. It offers a 4.13" display with -given its sizean unusually high resolution of 800x480 pixels which, using a stylus, can be utilized as a touch screen. It connects wireless through Bluetooth (connecting to a mobile phone) or through a common WiFi to the Internet. It is also possible to connect to another PC through the integrated USB port. The device has no hard disk, but flash-based storage is included which can be extended with external flash storage media. Since the N800, a VGA webcam has been integrated and in the N810 a GPS receiver is also included.
The Maemo Community
The operating system and the software of the Nokia Internet Tablet are based on the A source code repository allows developers to add new software components to the product and upload improved software that resolves problems and bugs in previous versions.
The Maemo source code has its own repository of source code. As of January 2007, our descriptive analysis shows that 33 developers added more than 7.2 million lines of code to this repository, forming the core of the operating system (although much of this is unmodified
code from other open source projects). Figure 2 visualizes growth in the source code over time. It should be noted that the developers were exclusively employees of Nokia or formally affiliated with the Maemo project, indicating that Nokia retains tight control over the actual changes that happen to the core system in the software architecture (see also Kuk, 2006) .
Figure 2: Lines of code in the Maemo Subversion code repository
In order to help identify and remove software bugs, Maemo also has a so-called "bug tracker" of its own. This is used to enter software errors, -or bugs, and keep track of the bugfixing process. Our analysis shows that in June 2008, this tracker contained 3228 bugs of which 1133 bugs were marked as "open," meaning that they were waiting to be fixed. to contribute to the innovation. In the mailing list geared towards development, more than 80% of all emails were sent by non-Nokia affiliates. In the next section, we present the findings from the case study.
Findings
The following section presents findings on the implementation of private-collective innovation in the case of the Nokia Internet Tablet development. The aim of this section is twofold: first, we illustrate a case of private-collective innovation with empirical data, providing specific benefits for the company involved. The findings confirm the six conjectures on benefits derived above from the existing literature and additionally identify a benefit in the case: faster time-to-market. In addition, we extend the model of privatecollective innovation, highlighting the hidden costs related to the implementation of privatecollective innovation and strategies to mitigate these costs. The benefits and costs of this extended model are summarized in Tables 2 and 3 .
Benefits Findings in the Nokia case

Low knowledge protection costs
Revealing source code rather than protecting it; however, undetermined costs for revealing. According to interviews with Nokia development managers, Nokia employees selected through the community were highly motivated to continue to work on technologies they already knew. Possibly intrinsic motivation, such as fun -often a primary cause of contributions to open source development -played a role in their continued high-level efforts (see e.g., Luthiger Stoll, 2006; Torvalds and Diamond, 2001 ).
Fourth, the private-collective innovation model proposes that being first to contribute a public goods innovation increases the likelihood of fast and widespread adoption of the innovation. According to the interviews, since the community was already familiar with underlying technologies, adapting existing applications from other projects to the Internet Tablet platform proved a relatively easy task. Nokia also invited competitors to participate in the creation and use of their platform, citing a "the more the merrier approach." By initiating a vendor-independent embedded software platform intended for use in other mobile devices, Nokia made it easier for volunteers, contractors, and competitors to contribute. Spreading the innovation and inviting others to participate was seen as crucial:
"We believe the world is changing and the competitive advantage comes from how many others you can get to participate in this network." (N1)
In fact, in July 2007, Intel announced they were adopting the Internet Tablet's user interface framework Hildon into their new product category called Mobile Internet Devices (Paul, 2007) , which will eventually lead to a higher developer and user basis of Nokia's Maemo platform.
Fifth, by contributing to public goods innovations firms can lower the cost of innovation.
Building on existing and mature technologies which could be integrated into the new hardware, Nokia enabled the development of a solid, yet cheap operating system for embedded platforms. Collaborating within existing open source projects allowed Nokia to benefit from the collective programming efforts:
"So what is happing in the D-BUS, in the GTK, in the GStreamer, in the Linux kernel is that I put two guys there, IBM puts two guys, Motorola maybe puts one guy, maybe Novell puts a couple of guys. So for the price of two guys, I get four or six guys working on the same problem." (N1)
Additionally, the company benefited from voluntary contributions leading to enhancements of the device. The volunteers contributed several innovations including applications, user interface improvements, translations, bug reports and fixes, testing different peripherals, and making feature requests. Letting volunteers experiment with the software also created "proof of concepts" which enabled innovations previously seen as unrealistic by Nokia engineers (V3). One example of this is the swap memory enhancement (using the flash memory as extended virtual memory) which was initiated by volunteer V4 and included in a subsequent official version of the Internet Tablet's operating system. Thus, the likelihood of finding a "killer application" (see e.g., Downes and Mui, 1998) As such, both the costs of innovation were kept low and ideas which would not have been developed otherwise could be tested and integrated:
say, twenty ideas a day and this community can develop a hundred ideas a day. So it's more important to be part of the community with a hundred ideas than by yourself with twenty ideas." (N1)
Investigating the software architecture, we found most contributions by volunteers were 28 separate applications which could be installed independently from the core operating system. The interviews showed that volunteers who made such contributions showed high commitment to and responsibility for their work, listening to user feedback and, in some cases, when others demanded it, even enhancing their software against their personal belief of the usefulness of the features (explained by V2). Through their contributions and feedback from users, volunteers slowly gravitated towards more development work in the community.
Sixth, supply by anyone of public goods innovations to the market enables manufacturers to learn about innovations and, thereby, reduce costs in manufacturing. This conjecture indicates particular benefits private-collective innovation in software offers to computer hardware manufacturers (von Hippel and von Krogh, 2003) . Through choosing a software platform which is available under an open source license as indicated, Nokia reduced fixed costs related to research and product development. Nokia manufactured and sold the Internet Tablet, but the product's functionality and, thus, ability to fulfill user needs were to a large extent shaped by the users themselves. User-developed applications, such as mapping and navigation software, could easily be installed by the end users themselves for free, keeping Nokia's costs down. Interestingly, in addition to fixed cost reduction, Maemo also has a positive impact on variable costs in manufacturing since Nokia did not have to pay a perdevice license fee to an intellectual property owner. For example, at the beginning of 2006, a comparable proprietary operating system, Symbian, demanded USD 7.5 per device for the first 2 million units.
In addition to confirming theoretical conjectures on benefits, one more benefit emerged in the study that should be considered crucial for private-collective innovation: faster time-tomarket. Using external, modular technologies not only impacted on costs, it also led to the 29 creation of a new operating system working on a new hardware platform in a short time.
According to interviews with N1 and N3, this fast development created flexibility which, combined with user feedback of pre-releases, allowed for a quick time-to-market compared to other devices the company had launched. 
Costs of implementation and strategies to mitigate these
While the benefits of private-collective innovation have been spelled out previously, the hidden costs of implementing the model have been neglected in previous work or remain unknown. In this section, we present the findings from the case study along five categories of costs together with Nokia's strategies (where applicable) to mitigate these. First, when software is freely available even to direct competitors, it is possible for current and future competitors to design clones that look like and behave in a very similar way to the original product. Competitors are in the position not only to imitate but to replicate the product (see Kogut and Zander, 1992) . This potential lack of differentiation of products represents a cost to the firm as it forfeits an opportunity to gain competitive advantage (Granstrand, 1999 Third, in order to facilitate the increasing involvement of volunteers, Nokia needed to carry the costs of reducing community entry barriers. The company invested in the creation of a Software Development Kit that enabled new volunteers to easily start development for the Internet Tablets. It is common practice for software manufacturers to provide such an SDK at high costs (Jacobson et al., 1999) . However in the case of the Internet Tablet, Nokia offered the development tools for free. In order to allow volunteers to adapt their software for upcoming platform releases, Nokia also offered a development snapshot of their work-inprogress (often including software for yet unannounced features) which could be used to ensure that an application would also run on future releases. Employees were sent to related conferences in order to increase awareness of the platform and answer questions from current and future volunteers and contractors. Additional staff, such as "community representative" N9, were hired in order to communicate between Nokia internal developers and the external community members. In order to mobilize more volunteers to join the Maemo community, Nokia sold 1,500 heavily subsidized devices to active open source developers. While such direct costs by Nokia cannot be mitigated easily, investments in community building, knowledge diffusion, and marketing may be lower in the future through sharing the effort with other community members. Some interviewees explained that, for example, with increasing popularity, well-integrated Maemo community members started to support new volunteers who were getting involved in the development process.
Fourth, by contributing source code to open source projects which were not managed by the company, Nokia gave up control of the future development direction of core technologies deployed in the company's hardware. According to N1, the company traded having full control of the technology for participation in joint development, thus benefiting from sharing the cost of innovation with outsiders. For example, GTK was originally intended for use on desktop PCs, and according to interviewees N1, C1, V2, V4, and N3, it was necessary to adapt GTK to the low resource environment of the Nokia Internet Tablets by decreasing memory consumption. In order to regain some control of these critical software components, Nokia hired key developers from the GTK community and contracted small enterprises with deep knowledge in this area. According to N3, the contribution of code improvements and modifications, combined with a meritocratic organization of the projects involved, gave Nokia enough influence on the direction of software development. Yet, the practice of contracting developers from incumbent communities such as GNOME in order to gain reputation and control raised concerns from some Maemo community members as to how Nokia would influence the future of the projects. Fifth, since the private-collective model of innovation incentives breaks with the traditional private-investment model that is prevalent in industry, it is reasonable to expect that the implementation of the model in an established firm incurs costs of organizational inertia (see Sorenson and Stuart, 2000) . Since the Internet Tablets also include software written by third-party vendors, Nokia needed to ensure that their software revealed to the 2 A so-called "fork" results when "dissatisfied programmers" copy the original source code from a project and continue its development in an alternative, competing project. Nokia employees also commented that the internal Nokia firewall would not allow connection to the official developer chat room of the Maemo community, which was located outside Nokia's network. In order to mitigate the costs of organizational inertia, Nokia employees stated that they would work on a case-by-case basis to remove obstacles.
Employees were, for example, assigned to make sure that entries in the external, publicly accessible bug tracking system would be paid attention to.
Altogether, Nokia managers were conscious of the trade-offs between revealing knowledge and technology and the benefits from participating in private-collective innovation. The following statement summarizes well the experiences had regarding the trade-offs between cost and benefits in the model: 6 Discussion and conclusion
In this paper, we identified a research gap in the literature on private-collective innovation (von Hippel and von Krogh, 2003; : little is known about the implementation by firms of the private-collective model of innovation incentives. We argued that the implementation of the model will be associated with benefits, "hidden" costs, and strategies to mitigate these.
In order to examine and extend the model through empirical work, we employed a case study design. Using quantitative and qualitative data, we demonstrated that the development of the Internet Tablet is a case of private-collective innovation. Next, we analyzed data from several sources in order to identify benefits and costs incurred in the implementation of privatecollective innovation and strategies by Nokia to mitigate these costs.
Nokia launched the Internet Tablet as a private-collective innovation project and as a lowcost probe (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997) . At the time of product launch, neither a product category nor a market for these devices existed. Rather than following existing market demand, Nokia targeted technology pioneers to find out who would use the Internet Tablet and how it would be used in real-life applications (similar to what Zander and Zander, 2005, called "exploiting the inside track'). Nokia opened up the product's software using externally developed open source technologies, allowed for and encouraged contributions by outsiders and, in the process, created a new market for a product it had envisioned. When the product proved successful, Nokia moved from targeting technology pioneers towards the mainstream market with the subsequent release of the Internet Tablet N800 and N810. This study confirmed most incentives to innovate identified in previous literature (von Hippel and von Krogh, 2003; . It remains inconclusive whether Nokia saved knowledge protection costs by revealing most of their software. However, the company gained skills and knowledge through collaborating with outside volunteers and contractors and, thus, also acted as a system integrator coordinating a loosely coupled network of component providers (see also Brusoni et al., 2001) system with only a handful of developers and was able to integrate ideas and improvements from other Maemo community members. In terms of costs, Nokia's manufacturing could benefit from low cost software development and avoided paying the common per-device license fees. Finally, our study found that increased flexibility and a faster time-to-market is a benefit in implementing private-collective innovation.
Thus, although the six benefits at first glance make it rational for the firm to choose private-collective innovation amongst alternative models, previous work also raised the awareness of unintended consequences or "hidden costs" resulting from implementing private-collective innovation. For example, in order to obtain outside contributions, a firm may need substantial investments in documenting the released software, training potential contributors, and developing online tutorials. These costs of implementation may offset the 37 benefits to private-collective innovation 3 .
We briefly reviewed literature that indicated "hidden costs" associated with the implementation of novel innovation models (Crawford, 1992; Kessler et al. 2000; Smith, 2004) . The study found that the implementation of the private-collective model of innovation incentives in Nokia's development of the Internet Tablet incurred costs and that the company found strategies to mitigate these. In particular, the potential lack of product differentiation as well as revealed business secrets incurred costs to the company. Nokia mitigated these costs by selectively revealing knowledge and technology. Another cost concerns the lowering of entry barriers to the Maemo community. The company invested in several measures to reduce such barriers, including discounted devices and a free SDK, as well as allocating employees responsible for community communication in order to attract further volunteers. Moreover, using technologies that are partly maintained externally has the advantage of shared innovation costs but implies giving up full control of the future development of that technology. Through hiring key developers of software for the product, Nokia regained some influence and control. Internal processes sometimes proved inadequate to enable a transparent and open development process, incurring some delays and costs as well as frustration in the community. Nokia acknowledged this challenge that the interviewees described as a "learning process."
The extended model of private-collective innovation provides additional insights for researchers. First, implementing private-collective innovation may enhance organizational learning and renewal, in addition to being a form of "open product development" (Chesbrough, 2003) . During the development of the Internet Tablets, Nokia adapted and 3 In addition, Osterloh and Rota (2004) pointed out that the mere presence of a firm in private-collective innovation may "crowd out" intrinsic motivation by voluntary contributors (e.g., fun and enjoyment). Harhoff et al. (2003) , modeling the payoff for innovators to freely reveal their innovations find that one of four conditions, "greater generality of the knowledge," reduces the likelihood of free-revealing by the innovator (see also Muller and Pénin, 2006) . However, this case study showed that much knowledge revealed proved to be generic frameworks: it laid the foundation for a generic embedded Linux desktop Limited by its design, the current study can only generalize findings to theory. The extended private-collective innovation model provides a set of benefits, costs, and mitigation strategies that must be tested on a larger sample in future research using cross-sectional as well as longitudinal designs. Thus, it will be important to garner insights on technological, industry, and market conditions that provide different levels of benefits and costs of innovation. For example, in industries of non-virtual goods or where product development constitutes a minor share of fixed costs in production (e.g., cement manufacturing), companies may find it more attractive to pursue private-investment innovation. Moreover, if innovation is largely based on tacit knowledge acquired through extensive and costly apprenticeship (e.g., luxury goods), volunteers who join product development products may be rare. Future research will also have to investigate the impact of company age and size on the innovation incentives in the private-collective model. As we found in the case of an established company, the process represented costs of organizational inertia.
Managers who want to experiment with flexible solutions, while keeping their own product development costs low, should investigate ways to implement private-collective innovation. Sharing development costs and enabling contributions from third parties, as well as boosting organizational learning, are powerful reasons why the model is attractive in practice. However, there are potential "hidden costs" in implementing the model. Learning from Nokia's successful approach, managers should think ahead about possible costs and create strategies to mitigate them. The experience from the development of the Internet Tablet provides possible mitigation strategies.
